VICE Sports Q&A: The Security Expert Who Believes We Are Doing Stadium Security Wrong

Editor's note: Welcome to our new VICE Sports Q and A, where we'll talk to authors, directors, and other interesting people about interesting sports things. Think of it as a podcast, only with words on a screen instead of noises in your earbuds.

The NFL increased security for their games over the weekend following the suicide bombings outside Stade de France in Paris on Friday. It's not clear what that increased security was meant to accomplish, but it assuaged many Americans' concerns nonetheless. America in particular loves its security theater, whether it's the TSA or the CLEAR system.

International security expert Rafi Sela, president of AR Challenges Ltd., a global security consulting group with offices in the US and Israel, has been a vocal critic of America's approach to security since 9/11. On Monday, I had a brief chat with him over the phone about what can be learned from the Stade de France bombings and what stadium security should look like going forward. The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

VICE Sports: What was your first reaction when you heard about the bombings at the stadium?

Rafi Sela: I don't know how you say "Holy shit" in French but, basically, in my opinion, there are two things the French actually did not do that they had to do. They didn't learn their lesson from Charlie Hebdo and the market incident in January. They didn't learn anything in two disciplines: one is intelligence and the other is response. Some of the people that were killed in the concert hall could have been saved if they knew what they were doing and would storm the concert hall two minutes after they were called in. This is something that I think when the dust settles, someone in the government should take a very hard look at who was responsible for these things and maybe either replace them or teach them how to do it right.

The Wall Street Journal reported that at least one of the bombers tried to get into the stadium but security stopped him. It's not totally clear what happened next but it seemed like he basically backed away and then detonated. From your perspective, how does this compare to how security should react in this situation?

Since I don't know what happened, it is hard for me to comment on it. But they shouldn't have been able to bring a suicide bomb vest even close to the stadium. The intelligence and police, special operations people, should have known about it and stopped it before it happened.

It's interesting you mention that, because it's something we see all the time in American stadiums—especially with the prevalence of things like metal detectors, in that it creates a large crowd gathering just outside the security checkpoint, an area that seems equally vulnerable as inside the stadium. Is this something security experts are concerned about?

Yes, definitely. And I've been on record since 9/11 and nobody listens. This is not the way to do it because everywhere that you try to check people, you create crowds. You cannot tell the suicide bomber what to blow up. So you know he doesn't have to blow up inside the stadium if he has 100 to 150 people standing in line waiting for metal detectors—he can blow himself up right there.

So what's the solution to this? Because the American attitude, at least, is always to add additional layers of security, but that seems to only exacerbate the problem further.

The American way is to try and find the weapons by scanning somehow. And that's not the way to do it. The Israeli way, for instance, and some of the British intelligence, is doing it by behavioral science, by looking at people, by trying to find out if they have intent to do something, if they're nervous, if they're acting weird, and that is not done in America.

Is one approach better than the other? Or does it require a combination of both?

First of all, it requires combination, but suicide bombers, who are the most dangerous of all of them, can be detected by experts ahead of time.

Through behavioral analysis?

That's what we [Israelis] do at our checkpoints for years. [Editor's note: predictive profiling, as this is often called, is a controversial concept since it often involves some level of racial profiling.]

I want to look ahead to mega-events, multi-day or multi-week tournaments that spread across multiple locations. Obviously Euro 2016 is getting a lot of attention since it's also in France this summer. What additional challenges does that create for security teams?

Eighty percent of security is intelligence. If the intelligence is not done correctly and not understanding what kind of threat is actually in front of them, then you can do 1,000 layers of security and it won't help.

What changes would have to be implemented by then to make security more effective? Or do you think it's not a matter of what's done at the stadium?

No, I don't think the stadium is the center of the focus and the center of attention. The attention should be the borders, the airports, the seaports, the public transportation, the venues leading to or from the event—these are the ones that have to be closely monitored and used with very broad intelligence in order to prevent incidents.

Not a lot of time has passed since the attacks themselves, but what have you seen in terms of the official response from sporting bodies regarding security at future events? Are you encouraged or discouraged by their response?

I'm usually discouraged because nobody learned the lesson. They continue to do the same, but more. And it doesn't work. Let me tell you something else: the amount of preparedness, the level of preparedness, is a combination of security and response. So if your security is not good enough, at least your response has to be excellent. And the response can save lives. What happened in Paris is exactly the opposite. They had poor security and a very, very low level of response.

Let's talk about response, because I think that's been getting a lot less attention than you think it warrants. What does a good response to an attack look like?

Well, I wasn't there, so from what I saw on television, it was chaos. The worst thing that can happen to a response team is chaos. You have to respond in an orderly manner. You can learn from Israel. When we have an incident, we respond perfectly. If we have casualties in a terrorist attack, it takes less than 12 minutes until everybody is in the hospital. This is a response nobody else can do, and the reason for that is training and having a scheduled and very organized response.

Both the U.S. and Europe use private firms to handle stadium security. You were interviewed for a 2013 USA Today investigation that found many holes in those private security firms. Do you think private firms are still an area of concern for fans going to stadiums?

Yes. And the reason is that there is no regulation. The Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and some of the local police do not have a structured, regulated security in which they train those companies. So each company is trying to do the best they can. Without a coordinated regulation, it will never work.

From the article, it sounds like companies are most concerned about providing a service to a stadium at an attractive price point. It's all about cost control for them, and not necessarily as much about security. Is that accurate?

It's true that you give it to the lowest bidder, but the lowest bidder doesn't have to be the worst performer. For that, you have to have regulations. If they stick to the regulations and they give you a better price, then they win the contract.

What kind of regulations do you think need to be put in place for the companies to do a better job in terms of stadium security?

Well, they need to be trained. They're not trained. They're just people who have military or police background, who get paid for private security, who are doing what they believe is the right thing to do. But there is no real set of rules to say: here is what you have to do, here is how you respond, here is how you detect, and all this. There are no rules, nothing.

What do you think are the critical lessons to take away from the Paris attacks?

I think all the Europeans, not only the French, need to better coordinate and upgrade their intelligence and security, and of course invest money and time to get the response in place.