Tennessee Football Can Build Leads, So Why Can't It Keep Them?

In what was supposed to be his breakthrough year at Tennessee, coach Butch Jones has somehow led his team to a 2-2 record, and is once again just hoping that his team can become bowl eligible.

That's not to say these Vols are bad. They're ranked 23rd by the Football Outsiders S&P ratings, which separate performance from record, and their last-second losses came at home against Oklahoma and at Florida. Sounds respectable, right? Problem is, Tennessee had huge leads in both of those games before blowing them in the fourth quarter. The Vols led 17-0 against Florida; 17-10 with 8:20 left; and 27-14 with 7:26 remaining.

After the loss, Jones was asked if he thought he coached well enough to win.

"I do. I thought we all did," he said. "It's one or two plays, and I think it's putting everything in perspective. I really believe that. We're two plays away, we're 10 seconds away from being 4-0, and we're 2-2. We can't let two plays or 10 seconds define who we are."

Close games are theoretically random. Despite what announcers and analysts have told us for years, there is no "clutch gene" that puts teams over the top, and teams don't win close games because they "want it more." Statistics have shown that close games go one way or another because of the variance present in sports. So on one hand, the Vols are just unlucky. Playing against this schedule, the S&P ratings suggest that the Vols should have 2.8 wins, so it's fair to say this team is playing like a 3-1 squad.

On the other hand, Jones has done everything possible to give those games away.

Game-planning in football is hard. It requires hours and hours of scouting to identify opponents' weaknesses, plus careful scheming to play to your team's strengths— and then, once the ball is kicked off, you sometimes have to rework your best-laid plans on the fly. Against Oklahoma and Florida, Tennessee did a great job of pre-game strategizing, but failed to adjust later on.

Take the Oklahoma game: Tennessee's production dropped off significantly in the second half, and the Vols didn't run a single successful play—defined as gaining 50% of the necessary first down yardage on first down, 70% on second down and 100% on third down—in the fourth quarter. The team's efficiency numbers weren't quite as bad in the second half against Florida, but they weren't exactly good, and in both losses an issue has emerged for the Vols: They play things way too close to the vest.

Tennessee ranks No. 10 nationally in success rate, which means the Vols are one of the best teams in the country at putting together a string of successful plays to eat up a lot of clock while driving down the field for a touchdown. That's a good strategy for early in games when defenses haven't yet had the time to adjust, and that has been reflected by the Vols' fast starts. But what about when defenses figure out what you like to do? That's when you have to take a shot downfield, and Tennessee has been largely unwilling to do that, ranking No. 70 in the nation in explosiveness.

Rather than shake things up—albeit through an inconsistent passing attack—the Vols are content to punt the ball away. That's a hidden issue. A more obvious problem is how Jones handles fourth down situations.

Even with a zero percent success rate in the fourth quarter, Tennessee absolutely should have beaten Oklahoma. Ironically, the back-breaking play came with 55 minutes left in the game. Tennessee had fourth-and-one on Oklahoma's one-yard line, but opted to kick the field goal. That's essentially leaving points—in all likelihood, four points—out on the field.

Coaches should go for it on fourth-and-one every time, but that's especially true on the opponent's one-yard line. Of course, Jones probably would point out that Tennessee was stymied on the previous play, meaning scoring a touchdown wouldn't be a sure thing. Fine. Nothing's a sure thing, but fourth-and-one is as close as it gets—and on off chance that Tennessee didn't convert, Oklahoma would have the ball on its own goal line in a situation that rarely leads to points.

The Vols made another ill-advised decision against Florida, opting to kick the field goal rather than go for a touchdown on fourth-and-two from the Gators' 16-yard line late in the second quarter. The funny thing is, Tennessee should know how this strategy works: Florida beat the Vols because it went a stunning five-for-five on fourth down.

Eventually, Tennessee will start winning some close games. The math makes that inevitable. However, if Jones wants to speed up the process, he need to review his decision-making in big moments and after his team races out to big leads.

As the coach himself might say, the Vols are just one or two adjustments away.