The 76ers are the Ideal Rebuilding Team

Across the NBA, NFL, and MLB my favorite teams right now are the Philadelphia 76ers, the Jacksonville Jaguars, and the Houston Astros. I've never really cared about these teams before. I have never lived near their home venues, nor do I have friends and family who have, via their own fandom, indoctrinated me as to the charming virtues of these teams—each one of them presently horrible, or, rather, "rebuilding."

Now, the term "rebuilding" can be tossed around the sporting discourse as often and as thoughtlessly as the most hollow, soul-numbing bit of corporate lingo. What separates "my" teams here, though, is that they really are no-quotes rebuilding. Each team has their own organizational vision, and that vision has been seamlessly shared from ownership to the front office and from front office to head coach. Each team makes a prolific amount of transactions, with every move aimed at discarding costlier, veteran talent in exchange for youth, potential, and financial flexibility. Each team has specific members of their front office who are known for wholeheartedly embracing the newest brands of analytics and statistical modeling.

These teams are interesting because all parties involved are making massive, audacious, career-defining gambles—and over the next few years we'll see, in real time, whether these plans worked. If these teams become "perpetual rebuilders" (a phrase that is equal parts euphemism and diss), well, some people will lose their jobs and the enthusiasm within this article will look absolutely loony with age. If these teams succeed, however, and succeed big, they could go a long way in defining the calculus for how championship-caliber organizations are created.

To lose on purpose, as all of these teams are plainly doing, is viewed as a cynical, not-very-sporting thing to do. Each losing season brings another high draft pick. This is viewed about as kindly as the rich prick who uses every loophole/accounting trick possible and winds up getting a tax return.

But! These teams are losing only because losing is a byproduct of collecting that young talent and flexibility. Therein lies the massive gamble that each team is making: they are betting that years of blowouts, late-season irrelevance, and half-empty home crowds are worth the price of eventual, sustained success. The 2016-2020 versions of these teams are basically already under intense scrutiny: these organizations have essentially sacrificed 2012 (or so) through 2015 so that the future iterations of these teams may be wildly successful. And if those future iterations are not wildly successful—and low-seed, wild-card entries into the playoffs are far from wildly successful—then the fanbases of these teams will feel a vicious double-burn: "We sat through years of unmitigated losing for this?"

In Houston, the Astros have stripped the team bare and rebuilt with high-pick prospects drafted by former Cardinal front-office man Jeff Luhnow. Luhnow helped draft and build the Cardinals teams which won the World Series in 2006 and 2011, as well as the team that lost last year's World Series. He took over the Astros in 2011 and has implemented an analytics-heavy approach from the top of the organization down. These have been seen in how the Astros approach defensive shifts as a purely numbers-based game as well in how they bungled the last two number one picks—high school pitcher Brady Aiken did not sign this year when both sides couldn't agree on a contract, and last year's selection, Stanford pitcher Mark Appel, is struggling in the low minors. The team's on the right track, but they've run into some bumps the last few months. If they really want to become perennial contenders, patience will be required, yes, but they won't get anywhere if they can't get the draft right.

In Jacksonville, progressive owner (being a non-white man counts as progressive in the NFL) Shad Kahn's team is taking some progressive measures of its own. The team hired Gus Bradley, the former defensive coordinator of the Seattle Seahawks who was the architect of that team's Super Bowl-winning defense, before last season. After some bruising, including a 0-8 start, the team pulled together during its bye-week to finish 4-4. Bradley's ability to fire the team up (witness him getting players amped for the Senior Bowl) seems to genuinely be working. It's so hard to win in the NFL, but with an organization committed to the building a team that Gus Bradley can coach up, the Jaguars might have found a new path to success.

The 76ers' plan is a hybrid of those two approaches. General manager Sam Hinkie may feel like he descended on sports from the egg-headed ivory towers of business academia, but he's also only 36 and possesses a work ethic and tireless mind that can feel intimidating.

Hinkie has frustrated some with his approach to the NBA's draft the last two Junes. Throughout the 2013-14 season, Hinkie made as many moves as possible to secure picks in this summer's draft, ending up with seven of the 60 total picks. Then, with his two first-round selections, Hinkie took Joel Embiid and Dario Saric, players who will not appear for the Sixers in 2014-15 due to injury and being contractually stuck overeseas, respectively. This came one year after Hinkie traded for Nerlens Noel in the 2013 Draft, knowing that Noel would miss the entire 2013-14 season, again, due to injury.

There are hints of impatience in Philly, too: Why did the Sixers lose so hard in 2013-14, only to acquire players who would only be able to help the team as distant in the future as possible? But Hinkie's patience will likely prove to be his greatest virtue: Noel, Embiid, and Saric were all picked at spots lower than their on-court talent suggested due to these delays at the starts of their careers. Despite never having a #1 pick (or even #2), the Sixers could very well end up with the best players of the 2013 and 2014 Drafts, thanks to their willingness to wait.

Hinkie's rapid, business-focused mind is offset by Brett Brown, the head coach Hinkie hired late last summer after a months-long search. With experience coaching in Australia, and as an assistant coach during the San Antonio Spurs' first four title runs, Brown brings deep and varied experience. He is also endlessly energetic, personable, and focused on developing young talent. It would appear that Brown is just about the perfect hire for the Sixers:

By selecting a gregarious personality like Brown to lead and shape the roster, it feels like an indication that Hinkie acknowledges and realizes the importance of a positive and personable working environment for the many players that he is acquiring. Unlike the Astros, grudgingly getting shifted around the infield, the Sixers seem like a really fun team to play for, like the Jaguars. I would want Brown to be my coach, or my uncle or something.

The Sixers have a vast quantity of players on cheap, unguaranteed contracts on their team for 2014-15. They're likely to lose big again, yes, but it also means that their team will be one of the few in the NBA that is truly merit-based: young players who play well will not be relegated to mop-up duty because he plays the same position as an overpriced veteran.

The recent past has seen the 76ers losing a lot of basketball games, but I don't think Hinkie will lose big for a third consecutive season. I'll call it: starting in 2015-16, the Sixers will start a long string of playoff appearances.

Philly fans have been waiting this long, so what's a couple more seasons of patience?

Follow Miles Wray on Twitter.